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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Appellant has asserted that the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j); jurisdiction, however, is subject to argument
as set forth in Issue IV, infra at 29.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE I
What is the proper standard of review for the Utah Supreme Court when reviewing
a trial court's ruling compelling arbitration?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper standard of review as to whether a contractual right of arbitration has
been waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether the trial court employed
the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness,
but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and the trial
court's finding in this regard should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which the
trial court is given deference. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 p.2d 356, 360
(Utah 1992)
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
This issue was preserved in Appellees' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule
60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and in supporting Memorandum
submitted concurrently. .See Record at 71-73 and 74-90.
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ISSUE II
Did the trial court properly vacate the default judgment, ordering that the parties
arbitrate their dispute according to their contractual agreement, and in so ruling find that
the Appellees had not waived their right to arbitrate?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of whether a contractual right of arbitration has been waived presents
mixed questions of law and fact: whether the trial court employed the proper standard of
waiver presents a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or
events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and the trial court's finding in this
regard should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which the trial court is given
deference. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 p.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992)
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
This issue was preserved in Appellees' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule
60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and in supporting Memorandum
submitted concurrently. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90.
ISSUE III
Did the Appellant lack the requisite equitable standing to assert any equitable
rights before the District or Supreme Court to support their argument that Appellees have
in fact waived their right to arbitration?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of whether Appellant lacks the requisite standing to assert any equitable
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claims before the Utah Supreme Court in support of their argument that Appellees have in
fact waived their right to arbitration is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.
Appellant must show that the trial court exceeded the boundaries set by principles or rules
of law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
This issue was preserved in Appellees' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule
60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and in supporting Memorandum
submitted concurrently. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90.
ISSUE IV
Is the Order appealed from a final order under the circumstances of this case, and
not interlocutory in nature and therefore should the Utah Supreme Court dismiss
Appellant's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of whether the district court's order is a final order and not interlocutory
in nature is a question of law.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
This issue of jurisdiction is preserved as a matter of law and can be raised at any
juncture in the proceedings.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) (1985);
3

Utah Code Ann. §78-22a (1991);
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-1 (1985);
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-3 (1985);
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-4 (1985);
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-18 (1985);
California Code of Civil Procedure §1292.2; See Addendum at A-4
California Code of Civil Procedure §1293; See Addendum at A-5
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3 (1990);
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 (1990);
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 5 (1990);
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) (1985);
The complete texts of the California statutes appear in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Cedar") and Appellees,
Sherry Bonelli and Bonelli & Associates (hereinafter referred to as "Bonelli") entered
into a written contract whereby Bonelli was to perform certain services for Cedar. See
Addendum at A-1. This contract was negotiated and entered into in San Diego,
California. The contract itself was fully integrated and completely and fully detailed the
rights, obligations and responsibilities of each of the parties. See Addendum at A-1. The
parties foresaw that a dispute might arise in relation to the contract. In order to more
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effectively deal with any possible dispute, the parties through their mutual assent
mandated that any such disputes would be submitted to binding arbitration in San Diego,
California. See Addendum at A-l at Article 4.6. Subsequently, a dispute arose between
the parties. Thereafter, in contravention of the parties' contract, Cedar brought an action
in the Fifth Judicial District Court in Iron County, Utah against Bonelli alleging breach of
contract. See Record at 2-14. Bonelli was served with Service of Process in California on
or about October 28, 2001. See Record at 19-23 and 24-26. Cedar then took Bonelli's
default on November 28, 2001 for the Bonelli's failure to respond to the Complaint and
Summons served on them on or about October 28, 2001. See Record at 29-30. The lower
court then set a hearing regarding the Notice of Petition for Default Judgment [sic]. The
hearing was scheduled for January 3, 2002 before the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite.
See Record at 31-35. Following the hearing on January 3, 2002, Judge Braithwaite
recused himself and the Honorable Judge Philip J. Eves was assigned to the case. See
Record at 36-37. Cedar then submitted a Motion for Default Judgment on February 27,
2002 and attached affidavits of Dr. Russell Olsen and Dr. Chad Anderson. See Record at
39-40, 41-51 and 52-62. The lower court entered a default judgment against Bonelli on
March 2, 2002. See Record at 63-64. Cedar then filed and mailed to Bonelli a Notice of
Entry of Judgment on May 13, 2002. .See Record at 65-68. Bonelli subsequently retained
the legal services of the Law Firm of Hughes & Bursell, P.C. See Record at 69-70. On
July 12, 2002 Bonelli filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for
Relief from Default Judgment along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
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support of said motion. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. Cedar filed its response to said
motion on July 22, 2002. .See Record at 91-103. Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment was heard on August 12, 2002.
See Record at 104-105. Following the hearing on Bonelli's motion, the matter was taken
under submission by the district court. The district court, Eves, J. entered its ruling on
August 19, 2002 granting Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion
for Relief from Default Judgment and ordering the parties to submit to arbitration as
provided in the parties' contract. See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at A-2.
Cedar then filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory
Order (Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for
Relief From Default Judgment). See Record 130-132. This Court granted Cedar's
Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order on October 23, 2002. See
Record at 134-135.
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Cedar filed a Complaint alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and damages on
September 19, 2001. See Record at 2-14. A default certificate was entered on November
28, 2001. See Record at 29-30. Subsequently, a default judgment was entered against
Bonelli on March 5, 2002. See Record at 63-64.
Bonelli filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief
from Default Judgment on July 12, 2002. See Record at 71-73. The District Court
entered a ruling granting Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion
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for Relief from Default Judgment on August 19,2002. See Record at 125-129; see also
Addendum at A-2. Cedar then filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Permission to
Appeal Interlocutory Order (Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Default Judgment). See Record at 130-132. This
Court granted said Petition on October 23, 2002. See Record at 134-135.
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The trial court in a memorandum decision granted Bonelli's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and ordered the
parties to submit to arbitration as provided in the parties' contract. This order set aside
the default judgment obtained in contravention of the parties' contract mandating
arbitration. See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at A-2.
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties' entered into a contract whereby Bonelli was to perform certain
services for Cedar. See Addendum at A-1. This contract was negotiated and entered into
in the State of California. That said contract also contains a mandatory arbitration clause,
which states the following:
Should any dispute arise between the parties over any
provision of this Agreement or over any performance
of this Agreement, said dispute shall be submitted to
binding arbitration. This arbitration shall be
conducted according to the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, but need not necessarily be
conducted by said organization. Each party shall
initially equally contribute to the costs of said
arbitration. During the arbitration, each party shall
bear its own attorney's fees. Arbitration proceeding
7

shall occur in the city and state of San Diego,
California.
See Addendum A-l at Article 4.6. (Emphasis added.)
Despite said arbitration clause and its mandatory application concerning disputes
between the parties, Cedar preemptively initiated legal proceedings in Iron County, Utah.
See Record at 2-14. Bonelli was personally served the complaint and summons on
October 28, 2001. See Record at 19-23 and 24-26. Bonelli failed to respond to the
complaint and a default certificate was entered against them on November 28, 2001. See
Record at 29-30. The court then set a hearing regarding the Notice of Petition for Default
Judgment. The hearing was scheduled for January 3, 2002 before the Honorable Robert
T. Braithwaite. See Record at 31-35. Following the hearing on January 3, 2002, Judge
Braithwaite recused himself and the Honorable Judge Philip J. Eves was assigned to the
case. See Record at 36-37. Cedar then submitted a motion for default judgment on
February 27, 2002 and attached affidavits of Dr. Russell Olsen and Dr. Chad Anderson.
See Record at 39-40, 41-51 and 52-62. The lower court entered default judgment against
Bonelli on March 5, 2002. See Record at 63-64. Cedar then filed and mailed to Bonelli a
Notice of Entry of Judgment on May 13, 2002. See Record at 65-68. Bonelli then
retained the legal services of the Law Firm of Hughes & Bursell, P.C. See Record at 6970. On July 12, 2002 Bonelli filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b)
Motion for Relief from Default Judgment along with a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in support of said motion. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. Cedar filed their
response to said motion on July 22, 2002. See Record at 91-103. Bonelli's Motion to
8

Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment was set for
hearing on August 12, 2002. See Record at 104-105. Following the hearing on Bonelli's
motion the matter was taken under submission by the Court. The Court made its ruling
on August 19, 2002 wherein Judge Eves granted Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment vacating said judgment and
ordered the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration as provided in the parties'
contract. .See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at A-2. Cedar then filed a Notice
of Filing of Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order (Order Re: Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Default Judgment).
See Record 130-132. The Utah Supreme Court granted Cedar's Petition for Permission to
Appeal an Interlocutory Order on October 23, 2002. See Record at 134-135.
Bonelli has not participated in this lawsuit because of its reliance on the parties'
contract, particularly the mandatory arbitration clause contained therein. Said clause
clearly requires arbitration in this instance to take place in San Diego, California, and
mandates that said arbitration follow the guidelines set forth by the American Arbitration
Association.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
The standard of review under Utah law provides that a determination of whether a
party has waived a contractual right to arbitration is a mixed question of fact and law.
Whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question,
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which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver
are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, regarding which
determinations the district court is given deference. It is clear that a substantial amount of
evidence supports the trial court's ruling.
ISSUE II
The trial court properly applied the doctrine of waiver as it relates to its finding
that Bonelli has not in fact waived its contractual right to arbitration.
ISSUE III
Cedar lacks the requisite equitable standing to assert any equitable rights before
the District or Supreme Court to support its claim that Bonelli has in fact waived its right
to arbitration.
ISSUE IV
The district court's order is a final order and not interlocutory in nature and
therefore Cedar's appeal should be denied due to lack of jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW COMPEL AFFIRMATION
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.
Under Utah law, cases regarding the issue of whether a contractual right to
arbitration has been waived have been subjected to a mixed standard of review by the
Utah Supreme Court. This standard is clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court as
follows:
10

[T]he issue of whether a contractual right of arbitration has been
waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether the
trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and
should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give
a district court deference.
Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1999); citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992).
Under this standard, this Court must review two aspects of the trial court's
decision in order to properly determine whether a waiver has occurred. The first aspect of
the analysis is to review and determine whether the trial court employed the proper legal
standard to the waiver question. This determination is reviewed for correctness. Id. at
576. The legal standard in Utah for determining whether a party has waived a contractual
right to arbitration is clearly delineated in the case of Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
Id., wherein the Utah Supreme Court set forth two conjunctive criteria for determining
whether a party had waived its contractual arbitration right. As this standard is delineated
in the conjunctive, Cedar's failure to establish either of the two criteria mandates
affirmation of the trial court's decision. The two criteria as set forth by the Chandler
court are that "waiver . .. must be based on both a finding of participation to a point
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice." Chandler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992). It is clear from the district
court ruling that the court relied on the proper standard as promulgated by the Utah
Supreme Court in the Chandler decision. See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at
A-2.
11

The next aspect of the standard of review analysis is the review of the district
court's findings re: "actions or events allegedly supporting waiver", which findings are
reviewed as factual determinations and therefore given deference by the appellate
tribunal. Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1999); citing Chandler v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992). The record as reflected by the district
court's ruling contains ample support for the district court's finding that Bonelli has not
waived its contractual right to arbitration.
ISSUE II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT BONELLI HAS NOT
WAIVED ITS CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO ARBITRATION.
i.

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS CONTRACTUALLY AGREED
ARBITRATION IN UTAH

The parties' contract is clearly an integrated written agreement whereby Cedar and
Bonelli agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration in San Diego, California
instead of through litigation. See Addendum A-l, Article 4.6. Pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-3 la-3, such an agreement is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except
upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged
as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-3 (1985).
Moreover, Utah case law supports a strong public and judicial policy toward encouraging
arbitration when parties have agreed to do so. For instance, in Robinson & Wells, P.C v.
Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court unanimously upheld a state
district court judgment confirming an arbitrator's award. Id. at 849. As part of its
12

reasoning, the Robinson decision recognized that "the policy of our law favors arbitration
as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes." Id. at 846. In Robinson,
the Utah Supreme Court also noted that in Utah, statutory provisions regarding arbitration
had been in existence since 1884. Id. The Robinson court, in referring to Utah Code
Annotated §78-3 la-1, significantly noted that the Utah Legislature had amended the
Arbitration Act "to permit valid an enforceable agreements [to arbitrate] for future as well
as present disputes." Id. The amendment was earlier held to be constitutional by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070
(Utah 1981), a decision that provides additional evidence of Utah's "strong public policy
in favor of arbitration as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling
disputes and easing court congestion." Robinson & Wells, P.C v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844,
846 (Utah 1983).
Recently, this Court in Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates,
40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002), again reasserted Utah's long standing policy of encouraging
arbitration by stating, "it is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of
arbitration, 'in keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes
when the parties have agreed not to litigate.'" Id. at 606. See also Reed v. Davis County
Sck Dist, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Docutel Olivetti Corp. v.
Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986)); See also McCoy v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 20 P.3d 901 (Utah 2001) ("It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a
manner that favors arbitration." (quoting DocutelPlivetti Corp., 731 P.2d at 479)); See
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also Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (stating "this
court has also recognized the strong public policy in favor of arbitration 'as an approved,
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.' ").
Given Utah's well recognized and articulated preference for arbitration, and the
fact that these parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate all disputes under the
contract, the Utah Supreme Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and thereby affirm
the parties' contractual and agreed upon duty to arbitrate their dispute.
ii.

UTAH LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING COMPELLING ARBITRATION.

Bonelli presents the parties' contract as convincing and indisputable evidence of
the existing arbitration agreement between the parties. See Addendum A-l, Section 4.6.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 la-4, upon demonstrating the existence of an
arbitration agreement, district courts are mandated to order the parties to arbitrate and stay
any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. In
fact, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "[wjhere the evidence relating to a purported
agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has no discretion under the statue.
It must compel arbitration." McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 20 P.3d 901, 904
(Utah 2001) (Emphasis Added). The arbitration language contained in the agreement,
which pertains to all disputes arising out of or connected with the contract, persuasively
establishes that the very issues of the instant case are clearly subject to arbitration, and not
judicial resolution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already clarified that, "[w]hen
parties agree to arbitrate, they waive the substantial right to judicial resolution of the
14

disputes." McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 20 P.3d 901, 904 (Utah 2001); citing
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998). Based on the foregoing, Bonelli
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling as supported by Utah
code and case law and in accordance with the parties' integrated and unambiguous
written contract.
The fact that the current case disposition required the trial court to set aside a
default judgment taken by Cedar in avoidance of its written agreement should not
dissuade this Court from affirming the trial court's decision. In Pledger v. Gillespie, 982
P.2d 572 (Utah 1999), the district court entered judgment in favor of Dr. Pledger pursuant
to his motion for summary judgment for services rendered to his patient Gillespie.
Subsequently, Gillespie's named third party defendant and insurer Cigna, joined in the
lawsuit. Cigna, twenty-eight months after summary judgment had been entered against
Gillespie, moved the District Court to compel arbitration alleging that Dr. Pledger's
payment dispute was covered under an arbitration agreement through Cigna's Health
plan. Id. at 575. The district court denied Cigna's motion, ruling "that due to the delay
between the time Cigna learned of the payment dispute and the date it sought to compel
arbitration, Cigna had waived its right to resolve the dispute through arbitration." Id. The
Utah Supreme Court, however, Russon J. held in a unanimous opinion that Cigna had not
waived its right under the agreement to arbitrate the payment even though more than two
years had passed since the time Cigna was made aware of the lawsuit and the summary
judgment entered against Cigna's insured. In so holding, the Pledger Court, referring to

15

Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah 1992), stated as follows:
In Chandler, we set forth the two-pronged standard for
determining whether a party has waived a contractual right of
arbitration: "Waiver ... must be based on both [i] a finding of
participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent
to arbitrate and [ii] a finding of prejudice." 833 P.2d at 360
(brackets added). We elaborated that "mere delay" in asserting
a right to arbitration is not enough to support waiver, see id. at
359; rather, the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate
actual prejudice or real harm resulting from the delay, such as
being disadvantaged in arbitration through participation in
pretrial procedures or incurring expenses that would not have
been incurred in arbitration, e.g., preparing to argue important
pretrial motions or conducting discovery not available in
arbitration. See id. at 359-60.Under these standards, the district
court erred in ruling that Cigna had waived its right to arbitrate
the payment dispute.
Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1999).
Indeed, though Cigna had been named and served in the lawsuit more than two
years earlier, and had copied all of the district court files, actively attempting to resolve
the suit, the Utah Supreme Court found that Cigna "had not participated at all in the
underlying litigation." Id. at 577. Ultimately, Cigna's first and only acts taken in the
litigation were comprised solely of two motions, one to compel arbitration and, corollary
thereto, one to set aside the summary judgment.
Beyond finding Cigna did not participate, the Utah Supreme Court further found
that Plaintiff, Dr. Pledger was not prejudiced, which is the second prong or criterion of
the waiver test as stated by this Court in Pledger.
Dr. Pledger has made no showing that he will be negatively
impacted by arbitrating the dispute at this juncture. Dr. Pledger
does not contend that he will be disadvantaged in arbitration by
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having participated in the litigation in district court. Moreover,
Dr. Pledger has not established that he incurred significant
expenses in the district court litigation that would not have been
incurred in arbitration.
Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1999)
Cedar, in the case at hand, has not made a single reference to any way in which it
has or will be prejudiced by arbitrating this dispute and has utterly failed to overcome the
second criterion in establishing Bonelli's waiver of its contractual rights to arbitration.
In Pledger, the Utah Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded the case to
the district court for entry of an order setting aside the summary judgment and directing
the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Id. at 578. In the instant case, Cedar
obtained a default judgment against Bonelli instead of a summary judgment; however,
this distinction is de minimis and indeed required less effort by Plaintiff. Consistent with
Pledger, the Utah Supreme Court should now affirm the trial court's ruling mandating
contractual arbitration. Indeed, Bonelli's initial appearance took exactly the same
position as Cigna's. Bonelli entered the litigation and the first and only motion filed with
the district court was one that sought to set aside a default judgment and compel the
parties to arbitrate as per their written agreement. Cedar seems more intent upon placing
blame squarely on Bonelli, when it was Cedar's choice to completely ignore the terms of
the fully executed and integrated contract and initiate the underlying lawsuit.
iii.

BONELLI HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO
ARBITRATION

The Utah Supreme Court held that a party waives the right to binding arbitration
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where that party substantially participates in the litigation process and the participation
results in prejudice to the opposing party. In determining waiver, it is clear that the trial
court must first conduct a factual inquiry as to whether the party seeking to enforce
arbitration has substantially participated in the litigation process. This can be satisfied by
looking at the various actions of the party seeking to enforce arbitration, and deciding
whether those actions evidence participation to a point inconsistent with the intent to
arbitrate. See Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 609
(Utah 2002). It stands to reason that "participation" would logically consist of actions
that evidence a party's intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress
through litigation, as well as a party's involvement in discovery, pretrial procedures and
submitting pleadings to invoke the court's judicial authority. Id. at 609. However, even
when there exists evidence of participation in the litigation process, the Chandler test
additionally requires that such participation be inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate
before waiver can be considered. In other words, a mere finding of participation is not
conclusive. Participation in the litigation must be of the type and nature which, when
objectively observed, suggests that the party does not want to arbitrate the dispute.
Illustrative of this point is this Court's reasoned decision in Central Florida
Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). In that case, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the defendants had not waived their contractual right to arbitrate
despite having previously filed both (1) an answer and a counterclaim and (2) a motion to
dismiss prior to filing the motion to compel arbitration. In fact, the defendants' answer in
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Central Florida Investments, Inc. did not even mention arbitration, and though the motion
to dismiss raised four arguments, none of those arguments expressly articulated
arbitration as a reason for dismissing the action. Significant also is the notion that the
Parkwest Defendants in counterclaiming took what could be construed as a desire to
litigate rather than arbitrate the dispute. Nevertheless, this Court found that the
defendants "did not participate in litigation to such an extent that it acted inconsistently
with the intent to arbitrate." Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates,
40 P.3d 599, 609 (Utah 2002).
In applying the Chandler test to the facts of the case at bar, Bonelli's actions in no
way demonstrated an intent to disregard or waive their right to arbitrate. Bonelli had not
participated in the litigation process whatsoever and Cedar can in no way satisfy the first
prong of Chandler, which requires not only participation but substantial participation.
Clearly, Bonelli's actions taken as a whole demonstrate an unwillingness and reluctance
to participate in litigation and an intent to arbitrate. In fact, Bonelli's first appearance in
this case was initiated by filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration. Based on these actions,
the trial court reasonably concluded that Bonelli had not substantially participated in the
litigation process to a point inconsistent with arbitration, and therefore, had not waived its
contractual right to arbitration.
Not only has Bonelli born their burden in supporting the first prong of the
Chandler test, which prong alone supports affirmation of the trial court's opinion, this
Court may also look to other grounds to support the trial court's determination that the

19

default be set aside and arbitration mandated. The Chandler case allows yet a second
prong or criterion to be examined and Cedar's failure to establish that prong is also fatal
to its appeal and supports the trial court's ruling. That prong is the burden Cedar bears of
showing that it was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling as "prejudice" is defined by Utah
case law. Clearly, in obtaining a default judgment, Cedar has expended a minimum
amount of effort and resources. As a corollary to the default judgment, however, no
discovery process or pre-trial motions were made nor were any claims severed or limited.
Consequently, Cedar has not been prejudiced by Utah law.
A clear example of comparable circumstances of "non-prejudice" is found in
Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). In
that case the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation and application of an
arbitration agreement. Central Florida Investments, Inc. (hereinafter "CFI") entered into
a real estate purchase contract with Parkwest Associates and Beaver Creek Associates
(hereinafter "PWA"). The real estate purchase contract contained an arbitration clause
for the resolution of any disputes arising under the contract. Subsequently, a dispute
arose and CFI filed an action on November 9, 1999, against PWA alleging breach of
contract and requesting specific performance among other things. CFI also filed a lis
pendens against the property subject to the real estate purchase contract. PWA answered
the complaint on December 13, 1999 making no mention of the arbitration agreement, but
counterclaimed against CFI in which PWA first raised the issue of arbitration. PWA also
filed a motion to dismiss and requested a release of the lis pendens on the same day its
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answer was filed. On February 28, 2000 the trial court granted PWA's motion to dismiss
with respect to specific performance and ordered released the lis pendens but did not
dismiss CFFs request for damages as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Prior to
the court's entry of the February 28th order, the parties initiated the early stages of
discovery including the filing of a scheduling order and the service of initial disclosures
by PWA on CFI. On March 9, 2000, PWA filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial
court denied the motion. PWA then filed an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. The
Utah Supreme Court addressed two issues in its opinion. First, did the parties agree to
arbitrate their disputes and second did PWA waive their right to arbitration. The Court
held that the contract did require arbitration and that PWA had not waived their right to
arbitration. See Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599,
610 (Utah 2002). The Court discussed at length the first prong of the Chandler analysis,
but what is even more revealing is the footnote to a rather brief review of the second
prong of the Chandler analysis requiring that the party seeking to prove waiver also show
that they have been prejudiced by the other party's participation. The Supreme Court
noted the following explanation:
Arguably CFI was prejudiced in a sense, in that PWA gained an
advantage by having CFFs complaint for specific performance
dismissed. Under the agreement, however, CFI had no right to
file the complaint for specific performance with its
accompanying lis pendens. The parties should have been sent
to arbitration, with neither party presenting anything before the
district court for consideration and decision. Thus, where CFI
actually was not entitled to bring the complaint, having it
dismissed, along with the lis pendens, is not a legal detriment in
this case.
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Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 611 (Utah 2002).
This analysis can easily be extended to the case at hand. Cedar can simply replace
CFI in the Court's analysis. If that is done, the Court's analysis would read in part as
follows: "Under the agreement Cedar had no right to file the complaint. .. The parties
should have been sent to arbitration, with neither party presenting anything before the
district court for consideration and decision. Thus, where Cedar was not entitled to bring
the complaint, having it dismissed, along with the default judgment, is not a legal
detriment in this case." Id. at 611. (Italics added to note change and emphasis) Cedar is
simply unable to show or prove that it has been prejudiced in any way by Bonelli's nonparticipation in the underlying litigation pursuant to the Utah standard of "prejudice".
Thus, beyond being unable to satisfy the first prong of Chandler regarding
"substantial participation", Cedar also has not proven or even mentioned any way in
which it has been prejudiced.
Interestingly enough, by agreeing to arbitration, both parties are held to have
waived their right to adjudicate the alleged dispute. See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P„2d
796, 799 (Utah 1998) ("When parties agree to arbitrate, they waive the substantial right to
judicial resolution of the disputes.") Cedar alone seeks to avoid the effect of this waiver.
Thus, in precipitously filing their complaint in the first instance, Cedar was attempting to
shop an alternate state forum and indeed a different manner of dispute resolution in clear
abrogation of its contract.
Cedar, in support of its claim of waiver, has inappropriately directed this Court's
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attention to a West Virginia case that, as explained by Cedar, seems to support its
proposition that if someone does not participate in a lawsuit and a default judgment is
taken against them, that party has in fact waived their right to arbitration. The case cited
by Cedar is State of West Virginia ex re I. Barden and Robeson Corp. v. Hill, 539 S.E.2nd
106 (W.V. 2000). The entire text of this case is attached hereto as A-3 of the addendum.
Cedar's reliance on this case is precarious at best. The West Virginia case is similar
factually, but the legal basis and foundation upon which it is based is entirely different
than the case at bar. West Virginia is one of approximately twenty-seven (27) states that
have not enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act and, furthermore, has no codified codes or
statutes that apply to the general application of arbitration to legal disputes. The West
Virginia code makes sporadic and cursory references to arbitration only in terms of
specific situations. Utah, on the other hand, is one of approximately thirty-three (33)
states that have enacted in one form or another the Uniform Arbitration Act. The
Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted in Utah contains the following sections that clearly
distinguish Utah from West Virginia in at least one critical area:
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-3 (1985) states: A written agreement
to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when
fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-4 (1985) states in pertinent part: The
court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an
issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration
agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the agreement,
the court shall determine those issues and order or deny
arbitration accordingly.
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The above noted statutes clearly delineate that the standards and foundation upon
which the Utah Courts are working are wholly and substantially different than those used
by the West Virginia courts. Furthermore, under the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, the West Virginia courts have determined that arbitration is an affirmative
defense that must be raised in the answer to any complaint if the party seeks to enforce
arbitration. The Utah courts, however, have consistently held that failure to raise a valid
arbitration clause in initial and even subsequent court filings does not, in and of itself,
nullify the existence or enforceability of the arbitration clause. In West Virginia, failure
to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense may lead the courts to determine that the
party has waived the right to arbitrate. On the other hand, for those approximately thirtythree (33) jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, not one of them
requires arbitration to be plead as an affirmative defense or considers the right to arbitrate
waived if the "defense" is not raised.
Multiple other jurisdictions share Utah's basic framework for deciding whether a
party has waived a contractual right to arbitration. The Court of Appeals in Texas in the
case ofHouston Lighting & Power Company v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366
(Tex. App. 1995) outlined the standard of waiver in the following language: "For a party
to waive the right to arbitration, that party must take action inconsistent with its right to
arbitration, and the party claiming waiver must be prejudiced." Houston Lighting &
Power Company v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366, 370; citing Psarianos v.
Standard Marine, Ltd, 728 F. Supp. 438, 449 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
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In Houston Lighting the Texas Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff, Houston
Lighting & Power Company had in fact waived the right to arbitrate, but that Court's
analysis was in line with the standard as set forth and as promulgated by this Court. In
that case four entities entered into an agreement in 1973 that called for the settlement of
disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The four entities were: Houston Lighting and
Power Company, Central Power and Light Company, the City of San Antonio and the
City of Austin. Following the execution of this original agreement, a dispute arose
between Houston Lighting and Power Company and Central Power and Light Company
in the early 1980's. In settling this earlier dispute, both Houston Lighting and Power
Company and Central Power and Light Company agreed that future disputes between
them would not be subject to the arbitration clause in the original agreement. In 1993 a
subsequent dispute arose among Houston Lighting and Power Company and the
remaining two parties to the original agreement. The City of Austin and the City of San
Antonio brought suit seeking declaratory judgment and Houston Lighting and Power
Company sought to compel arbitration as provided for in the original agreement. The
Texas Court of Appeals found that Houston Lighting and Power Company had waived its
right to arbitrate upon entering into its settlement agreement with Central Power and
Lighting Company in 1992, which specifically stated that all future disputes between
Central Power and Lighting Company and Houston Lighting and Power Company would
not be subject to arbitration. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled as follows: "We would
not favor a construction under which the rights of one of the parties to the contract could
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be determined even in that party's rightful absence from the arbitration proceeding."
Houston Lighting & Power Company v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366, 371. The
Texas Court of Appeals held that Houston Lighting and Power Company had in fact
waived its right to arbitration and could not selectively enforce it based upon the
particular facts of the case.
Furthermore, similar phraseology to that found in Utah has been adopted by the
North Carolina courts. In the case of Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated as follows: "Our Supreme Court has
held that the party opposing arbitration must prove that it was prejudiced by its
adversary's delay or by actions of the adversary which were incompatible with
arbitration." Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); citing Sturm v.
Schamens, 392 S.E.2d 432, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). This standard references Utah
principles though in one significant aspect is dissimilar to Utah law as it is in the
disjunctive. Simply stated, in Utah, a party seeking to negate another party's contractual
right to arbitration must overcome both burdens. As to the element of prejudice, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) further outlined several examples of what may constitute prejudice as follows:
A party may be prejudiced by [its] adversary's delay in seeking
arbitration if (1) it is forced to bear the expense of a long trial,
(2) it loses helpful evidence, (3) it takes steps in litigation to its
detriment or expends significant amounts of money on the
litigation, or (4) its opponent makes use of judicial discovery
procedures not available in arbitration.
Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); citing Servomation Corp. v.
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Hickory Construction Co., 342 S.E.2d 853,854 (N.C. 1986).
The North Carlina court in Sullivan found that the party objecting to arbitration did
not in fact suffer prejudice and therefore the right to arbitrate was not waived. Sullivan v.
Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118,121 (N.C. 1998).
The above-noted cases detail and offer a snapshot of the standards used by other
jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act in whole or in part. The
standard as adopted by this Court is in accordance with various other jurisdictions and,
based upon that standard, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and thereby
compel these parties to arbitrate their dispute as per their written contract.
ISSUE III
IN ORDER FOR CEDAR TO ASSERT ANY EQUITABLE RIGHTS
BEFORE THIS COURT THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO FIRST DO
EQUITY.
There is a legal maxim that has been adopted and applied by Courts across the
country that states: "He Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity." Both parties, or their
authorized agents, signed the contract and agreed to its terms and provisions. Cedar was
aware of the mandatory arbitration provision prior to starting this precipitous court action
in a state forum contrary to the contractual terms, but Cedar decided to conscientiously
ignore the arbitration provision. Why? Perhaps to avail themselves of the fact that
Bonelli resides out-of-state from Cedar's chosen forum and would not understand that
lower courts are burdened and not prone to assert sua sponte advocacy for arbitration,
which the contract specifies. Cedar filed their default certificate without any need for
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discovery or use of pretrial motions. Enforcement of a Utah judgment, if pursued, would
in all likelihood require domestication of that judgment in California, the contractually
designated forum in the first instance. Such machinations and avoidance of contractual
obligations should not be given deference by the Courts of Utah and amount to little more
than forum shopping. Ultimately, such conduct falls outside the bounds of fair play and
in no way promotes justice.
It is apparent throughout Cedar's brief that its main contention is that Bonelli
ignored the proceedings to such an extent that contrary to established case law, this Court
should hold that Bonelli has in fact waived its right to arbitration. Cedar goes to great
lengths to belabor this point making reference after reference to the fact that Bonelli has
failed to participate in any respect in the underlying litigation. Basically, Cedar argues
that Bonelli has acted in such an egregious manner that Bonelli should not be rewarded
for its inaction.
However, as has been thoroughly established throughout legal history "one who
seeks equity must first do equity." With that simple maxim in mind, one must look at and
examine the actions of Cedar in this matter. The Honorable Judge Eves of the Fifth
District Court staled in a footnote to his ruling that: "Plaintiffs disregard for the
mandatory arbitration clause could be viewed as a breach of the parties' contract." See
Addendum at A-2 at page 4. Cedar sought to completely disregard the terms of its own
fully integrated and complete contract in an apparent attempt to secure a judgment in a
forum foreign to the contractually agreed upon one. Had Cedar simply complied with its
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own contract, then this entire suit would have been avoided. Therefore, Cedar's
contention that Bonelli has in some way acted in bad faith is trumped and superseded by
the fact that this entire process would not have taken place had Cedar not breached the
contract to begin with. To focus only on Bonelli's actions and simply ignore Cedar's
actions would be to defy the well established laws of equity stating again that "one who
seeks equity must first do equity."
ISSUE IV
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER AND NOT
INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE AND THEREFORE CEDAR'S APPEAL
SHOULD BE DENIED DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The trial court's ruling vacating the default judgment and mandating arbitration
was a final order and not subject to an interlocutory appeal.
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines that: "An appeal may be
taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
appeal for all final orders and judgments..." Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 (1990)
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: "In a case in which
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P.
Rule 4 (1990)
Appellant, however, brought this appeal under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure which provides for: "An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
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sought by any party filing a petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after
the entry of the order of the trial court. . . . " Utah R. App. P. Rule 5 (1990)
Rule 5 additionally provides that: "A timely appeal from an order certified under
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines is not final
may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be considered by the appellate court as a
petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.55 Utah R. App. P. Rule 5 (1990)
(Emphasis Added)
As is clearly delineated above, a litigant seeking an interlocutory appeal from a
final order does not endow this Court with jurisdiction to hear the matter and such a
petition does not toll the running of the time limit to perfect an appeal from the final order
or judgment. However, a litigant who files an appeal as if from a final order or judgment
when in fact the appeal is from an interlocutory order endows the appellate court,
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the discretion to treat
that appeal as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. However, the
Courts view this as extraordinary relief and to date there is not a single reported case
where the Court has exercised this discretion. Therefore, Cedar had thirty (30) days
following the entry of the order to perfect their appeal, which Cedar failed to do. Cedar
incorrectly chose instead to pursue their appeal under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
In most cases, appeals from an order mandating arbitration are in fact interlocutory
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in nature. Utah Code Annotated §78-3 la-4(3) states that: "An order to submit an
agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to
arbitration under the agreement." Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-4(3) (1985) (Emphasis
Added) The literal interpretation of this section of the Utah Code would seem to support
the position that the Court from which the order or ruling compelling arbitration was
entered would retain jurisdiction over the matter. This position is further illustrated by
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3la-18 which states as follows:
If an arbitration agreement provides that arbitration be held in a
specified county, the district court of that county has jurisdiction
to hear the initial motion for arbitration. If no provision is made,
hearing on the initial motion for arbitration shall be before the
district court of the county where the adverse party resides or
has a place of business or, if the adverse party has no residence
or place of business in this state, in the county in which the
adverse party is served. Unless the court with jurisdiction
otherwise orders, all subsequent motions or hearings incident to
the arbitration proceeding shall be heard by the court hearing the
initial motion.
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-18 (1985)
However, under the circumstances of this case, this code section illustrates the fact
that the Utah Court retained no jurisdiction over this matter, once the ruling compelling
arbitration was entered. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-3 la-18, the county in
which arbitration is to be held has jurisdiction over the underlying matter. Cedar, as has
been detailed at length above, precipitously commenced this action in a forum that was
not only contrary to the fully integrated and executed contract, but in a forum that
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-3 la-18 had no initial jurisdiction over the matter,
given the existence of the mandatory arbitration clause in the parties9 contract, which
specifically mandated that arbitration was to take place in San Diego, California.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held in the case of Salt Lake City
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Corporation v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, (Utah 1979) what constitutes a final order or
judgment. The court held that "[a] judgment is final when it ends the controversy
between the parties." Id. at 539. Clearly, one may argue that the trial court's ruling did
not "end the controversy between the parties" because it simply mandated that the parties
arbitrate their dispute. In most instances such a mandate would not serve as a final order,
but in this case it cannot be viewed any other way. In ordering the parties to arbitrate
their dispute according to the terms of the contract, the Utah trial court divested itself
from any further jurisdiction. Consequently, so far as the Utah Courts are concerned, the
controversy between the parties in Utah is over. Utah statutes as detailed above support
the proposition that when the trial court mandated arbitration, it retained no further
jurisdiction over the matter because of the parties' contract, which specifically references
the agreed upon forum for arbitration as San Diego, California. This locus mandates that
the California courts would assume all further jurisdiction in this matter. Any case in
Utah would thus be initiated, if at all, by domestication of a California judgment entered
after arbitration pursuant to chapter 22a of Title 78 of the Utah Code.
Therefore, the Utah Courts retained no jurisdiction over the matter and
consequently, the ruling handed down by the trial court was final. In light of the
foregoing and under the particular circumstances of this case, the Utah Supreme Court
should hold that the ruling is a final order and, as such, Cedar failed to perfect its appeal
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Additionally, California law is further illustrative of this point and supports
Bonelli's position that the Utah Courts retained no jurisdiction over this matter once it
compelled the parties to arbitrate their dispute. As California is the contractually
designated forum for the arbitration, it would be helpful to determine what California law
has to say on the issue of arbitration and its enforcement and procedure. California Code
of Civil Procedure §1292.2 states the following: "Any petition made after the
commencement or completion of arbitration shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction
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in the county where the arbitration is being or has been held . . . . " Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§1292.2 (West 1993) See Addendum at A-4 Therefore, following the Utah trial court
mandating arbitration, the Utah trial court retained no jurisdiction over the matter. The
parties were mandated to commence arbitration in the contractually agreed upon forum of
San Diego, California. Any further proceedings in relation to any arbitration award,
judgment or order is rightfully under the jurisdiction of the California courts and more
specifically the courts located in the county of San Diego. This would include, but not be
limited to petitions to confirm, amend, vacate, set aside, correct and/or enforce the
arbitration award as well as including any petitions brought during the arbitration related
to discovery or other arbitration procedures.
Additionally, California Code of Civil Procedure §1293 provides the following:
The making of an agreement... providing for arbitration to be
had within this State shall be deemed a consent of the parties
thereto to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enforce
such agreement by the making of any orders provided for in this
title and by entering of judgment on an award under the
agreement.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1293 (West 1961); See Addendum at A-5.
Cedar entered into a fully integrated contract whereby the parties mutually agreed
that any dispute arising thereunder would be subject to arbitration in San Diego,
California. In so agreeing, Cedar accepted and acknowledged the jurisdiction of the
California Courts relating to the enforcement of said agreement or the entering of any
judgment that may or may not be awarded though arbitration. Consequently, upon the
Utah trial court's ruling setting aside the default judgment and compelling the parties to
arbitrate, the Utah trial court retained no jurisdiction over this matter and for all intents
and purposes transferred all further jurisdiction of this matter to the California courts.
This position as detailed above is supported by not only the code of Utah, the forum state
of the underlying proceedings, but is further supported by the code of California, the
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contractually agreed upon forum for the arbitration of disputes arising under the contract.
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court should hold that Cedar has failed to
perfect its appeal and that the Utah Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over this matter.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling in the instant case is amply supported by the record and by
Utah code and case law. Cedar has failed to prove that Bonelli waived its contractual
right to arbitration by failing to bear the burden of showing that Bonelli participated in the
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and by failing to show any way
in which Cedar was prejudiced. Further, Cedar lacks the requisite clean hands to pursue
any equitable remedy. Ultimately, the order from which the interlocutory appeal was
taken was a final order and Cedar has failed to timely perfect its appeal.
Consequently, Bonelli respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court affirm
the trial court's ruling compelling the parties to settle their dispute by arbitration on either
a factual analysis, on equitable grounds or by declining jurisdiction altogether.

/
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ADDENDUM

Parties' Contract
Trial Court's Ruling
State of West Virginia ex rel. Barden and Robeson Corp. v. Hill 539
S.E.2nd 106 (W.Va. 2000)
California Code of Civil Procedure §1292.2
California Code of Civil Procedure §1293

A-l
A-2
A-3
A-4
A-5

ADDENDUM

PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENT

This agreement is by and between Bondli & Associates, hereinafter referred to as "CONSULTANT
M
f and
Cedar S urgery Center, LLC*

hereinafter referred to as "CLIENT."

ARTICLEI:

CONSULTANT'S PROVISIONS AND OBLIGATIONS

1.1 CONSULTANT agrees to provide the services as outlined in Initial Project DevdopmentSenices,
Exhibit A,
12 NOTICE: No assurances are being given in the complete acquisition of all third party payor
contracts. Contracting goals will be to
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Conduct initial suney of potential payors,
Generate list of individual potential payors with associatedfee schedule.
Kefine list of individual potential payors, including names and addresses of
contact persons and proposed payment methodology.
Obtain approval from Client of potential payors, including, without limitation,
approval of proposed payment methodology.

1.3 CONSULTANT expressly acknowledges that it shall have no power or authority to execute any
Contracts or binding obligations of any nature on behalf of the Client or the Center and that all
such contracts and obligations must be approved and undertaken directly by the Client an&br the
Center, as applicable.
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ARTICLE 27:

B&A:

CLIENT OBLIGATIONS

11 CLIENT agrees to pay forsenices prouded by Bondli & Associates based upon the rate structure
and payment schedule as outlined below:
$ 4,000,00
$3,800.00
$ 3,800-00
$ 3,800.00
$ 3,800.00
$ 3,800.00

Commencement Deposit
August 1,2000
September 1,2000
October 1,2000
November 1,2000
December 1,2000

All reasonable tra>el expenses shall be reimbursed by the Client to Bonelli & Associates
and are not considered as part of the project fee. Travel expends to included airfare, car
rental, and lodging. Bondli & Associates will obtain prior written approval of all
travel expenditures totaling in excess of $ 1,300.00 for a single trip and will promptly
provide the Client with adequate records and other documentary evidence required to
substantiate such expenditures as business expenditures for tax purposes.

ARTICLE JOT: EFFECTIVE DATE AND TERM OF CONTRACT
3,1 Effective Date: The effective date of this agreement shall be July 24,200tt
32 Term of Agreement: The term of this Agreement sh all be from July 24,2000 until
final payment is received by consultant for all senices provided and additional expenses
incurred*
3-3 Ternination Without Cause: Either party may terminate this Agreement without cause. A 30
day notice must be given by either party, before the date of termination becomes effective.
3.4 Effects of Ternination: Upon termination of the contract the following events will occur:
(a)

Client agrees to pay for all fees for services rendered to date. Payment to be
received 30 days from date of termination notice.

(b)

Consultant agrees to provide an immediate invoice for any outstanding fee or
expenses upon receipt of termination notice.

(c)

Consultant agrees to provide client with copies of all records generated on
client's behalf* Records to be provided upon receipt of final payment to
consultant
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ARTICLE IV: GENERAL PROVISIONS
4A Agreement' This agreement has been presented to authorized representatives of both parties
who have reviewed it and agree upon the terms and conditions set forth herein and to the
interpretation of said terms and conditions.

4.2 Independent Contractors The relationship between the consultant and the client is an
independent contractual relationship.
4.3 Notice: Any notice under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been
given when delivered personally to an officer of either party or forty-eight hours after deposited in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed to the parties at the
address setforthon the signature page or such subsequent address as either party may provide for
that purpose,
44 Amendment' Either party reserves the right to modify this Agreement during the contract term
Modifications shall be effective thirty (30) days after mailing of written notice and shall be deemed
accepted by the other Party unless written objection to a modification is received by the initiating
Party within such thirty (30) days.
4.5 Assignment: Neither this Agreement nor any interest herein shall be assigned,
transferred
or otherwise conveyed by either party without the prior written consent of the other Party,
Any
attempted assignment in violation of this provision shall be void.
4.6 Arbitration Between Paries: Should any dispute arise between the parties over any provision of
this Agreement or over any performance of this Agreement, said dispute shall be submitted to
binding arbitration. This arbitration shall be conducted according to the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, but need not necessarily be conducted by said organization* Each party
shall initially equally contribute to the costs of said arbitration. During the arbitration, each party
shall bear its own attorney's fees. Arbitration proceedings shall occur in the city and state of San
Diego, California.
IN WETNESS WBEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement effective as of the date
first abo\e written.
Bondli & Associates
221 West Crest Suite 201

Chad Anderson, MJD.
Russ Olson, DJPJM*
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Exhibit A: FEE & SERVICE SCHEDULE
COMPREHENSIVE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT SERVICES
Practice/Insurance Management to Include:
Strategic Planning and Assessment Consultation Visit
Practice Analysis/Charge Master orMCO Fee Schedule Development
Development ofMarketing Program
Preparation ofMCO "RFPs"
(Includes Payor Survey and Negotiations as Facility Liaison)
StaffDevelopment(Includes Employee Handbook))
SetUp ofInventory Program and Procurement ofPurchased Services
Development ofFiscal Management Policies
Development ofBilling and Collection Policies
(Includes Staff Workshop during one of two 2 day Onsite Visits
and Assistance in Selection or Structuring MIS System)
Development of the Center's Corporate Compliance Program
$ 8,000,00 1

Single Specialty

Compliance, Certification, Licensure, & Accreditation:
f Planning and Development of Ambulatory Surgery Center's
I Compliance with Standards and Regulations for Ambulatory
J Surgery Centers and Safe Office Practices Including Policy and
W Procedures Manuals
I^^Development ofCQI and Risk Management Program
^
Preparation for Licensure Certification and Accreditation surveys
Single Specialty

S 15,000.00

Equipment Management (Separate Contract with Scott Farris)
Services for the selection and determination of Equipment
Coordinate Installation and SetUp of Equipment
$ 12,000-001

Single Specialty

* Excludes all travel related expenses; but includes telephone, usual and customary office
expenses.
Fees Effective Through December 31,200Q
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CEDAR SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION

vs.
SHERRY BONELLI (individually and dba
Bonelli & Associates), and BONELLI &
ASSOCIATES, a California general
partnership,

Case No. 010500654
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief for Default Judgment, filed July 12, 2002. Plaintiff
filed an Opposition thereto on July 22, 2002, and Defendants filed a Reply on July 30, 2002.
The matter was heard on August 12, 2002, at which time both sides presented argument.
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda, having heard the parties' arguments, having reviewed
the relevant law on the matter, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as
follows.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. filed a Complaint against Defendant Sherry
Bonelli and her partnership on September 19, 2001. Plaintiff had Defendants personally served
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-2with a Summons and Complaint on October 28, 2001. Defendants did not file an answer, or any
other response, to the Complaint. Plaintiff took Default against Defendants on November 29,
2001. Defendants filed the current Motion on July 12, 2002, seeking to enforce a provision of
the contract between the parties that provided that all disputes between the parties would be
submitted to binding arbitration.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants waived the right to arbitration by inaction and a complete
failure to respond in any way to the Complaint. Plaintiff point to the fact that Defendants did not
assert the right to arbitration until eight (8) months after Default had been taken.
Defendants argue that there has been no "substantial participation" in this litigation by
them, and no evidence of an intent to waive arbitration, and thereby no waiver of the right to
arbitrate.
Neither party has been able to locate any Utah case law that squarely addresses the factual
setting of this case.

ANALYSIS
Defendant here took no steps at all that could be viewed as participation in the litigation,
let alone substantial steps as required under the law, and cannot be said to have waived the right
to arbitration.
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 365,
(Utah 1992), "a waiver occurs when the party seeking arbitration substantially participates in
litigation, to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and this participation results in
prejudice to the opposing party." Chandler, at 358. The Court did not define "participation", but
the clear inference from the case law is that one must answer the complaint or motion the court
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for relief, other than a dismissal, before one can be said to have participated in the litigation.
In the present case, Defendant did nothing at all when served with the Complaint, which
resulted in the entry of default. It is difficult to see how Defendant thereby "substantially
participated" in the litigation. The Chandler court continued, "[t]he party claiming waiver has
the burden of establishing participation and prejudice." Chandler, at 359. Plaintiffs here argue
that "Defendants' non-participation was a willful choice not to participate or respond or assert
defenses or rights (including arbitration rights)..." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, p. 3
(emphasis in original). It appears the even the Plaintiff agrees that the inaction of the Defendants
was not participation, but a decision not to participate.
Additionally, the Chandler court stated that for waiver of the right to arbitration to occur,
the substantial participation must be "to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate . . .".
Chandler, at 358. It caimot in good faith be argued that Defendants' choice not to do a thing was
inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. In fact, the reverse seems more logical. By ignoring the
litigation, the Defendants would seem to be asserting their right to have the dispute submitted to
arbitration, rather than to become involved in the litigation filed by the Plaintiff in contravention
of the contract terms.
Further, as held by the Utah Supreme Court in Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs.,
2002UT3,40P.3d599:
This first part of the Chandler test [determining whether there was substantial
participation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate] looks at the
actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through
litigation.
Cent. Fla. Invs.. Inc., at ^[26, 40 P.3d at 609.
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-4Here, Defendants certainly took no actions which could be viewed as evidencing "an
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court."
Because of its determination that the Defendants did not substantially participated in this
matter, and certainly not to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, the Court need not
reach the second part of the test set forth in Chandler, whether Plaintiff was prejudiced by
Defendants actions (or inaction).

CONCLUSION
Defendants here undertook no action when served with the complaint herein and
therefore did not participate in the litigation whatsoever, and certainly not to a point that could be
viewed as "substantial" and "inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate." Defendants' Motion to
Compel Arbitration is therefore granted, and the parties are ordered to submit to arbitration as
provided in the parties' contract.
The Default Judgment entered by this Court is hereby set aside as such judgment was
obtained in contravention of terms of the parties' contract1, and therefore falls under Rule
60(b)(6), which provides for relief from judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment."
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of August 2002.

J./RIU? EVES
District Court Judge

Plaintiff's disregard for the mandatory arbitration clause could be viewed as a breach of the parties'
contract.
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-5Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of August 2002,1 mailed true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:

Randall C. Allen, Esq.
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES, LLP
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, UT 84721
Mike E. Starts, Esq.
HUGHES & BURSELL, P.C.
187 N. 100 West
St. George, UT 84770

Deputy Court Clerk
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208 W. Va. 163, *; 539 S.E.2d 106, **;
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LEXSEE539s.e.2ndl06
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL. THE BARDEN AND ROBESON
CORPORATION, a New York corporation; and BOB HUTTON and GENE
HUTTON, d/b/a BUILDINGS, INC., Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE GEORGE
W. HILL, JR., JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WOOD COUNTY; AND
FELLOWSHIP BAPTIST CHURCH, BY AND THROUGH ITS TRUSTEES,
GLEN GAINER, n i , CLAYTON BOND AND KERMIT POLAN, Respondents
No. 26837
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
208 W. Va. 163; 539 S.K2d 106; 2000 W. Va. LEXIS 77
January 11, 2000, Submitted
July 12, 2000, Filed

DISPOSITION:
[***1] WRIT DENIED.

COUNSEL:
John F. Loehr, Esq., Shawn R. Romano, Esq., Daniels
Law Firm, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys
for Petitioners.
Robert L. Bays, Esq., C. Edward McDonough, Esq.,
Bowles, Rice, McDavid, Graff & Love PLLC,
Parkersburg, West Virginia, Attorneys for Respondent
Fellowship Baptist Church.
JUDGES:
JUSTICE McGRAW delivered the Opinion of the Court.
OPINIONBY:
McGraw
OPINION:
[**108] [*165] Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
McGraw, Justice:
In this original jurisdiction proceeding, petitioners
seek a writ of prohibition requiring the Circuit Court of
Wood County to vacate a default-judgment order entered
in a breach-of-contract action brought against them by
respondent Fellowship Baptist Church ("Church").
Petitioners assert that the lower court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit due to the
existence of an arbitration provision in a contract [***3]
between the Church and petitioner Barden and Robeson
Corporation ("Barden"). We reject petitioners' request for
prohibition relief, finding that an agreement to arbitrate a
dispute does not divest a court of subject matter
jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND
The pertinent facts of this case, as stated in the
pleadings before us, are straightforward. Petitioners were
involved in designing and constructing an addition to the
Church's building in Vienna, West Virginia. After the
work was completed, the Church asserted that the height
of the ceiling in the basement of the addition was lower
than what was agreed to. Specifically, it has maintained
that it specified the ceiling height at nine feet, and that
while early plans provided by Barden indicated such
height, the ceiling was subsequently lowered to seven
feet, eight inches without the Church being given
adequate notice of such change.
The work was performed pursuant to two contracts:
one between the Church and petitioners Bob and Gene
Hutton, doing business as Ray Builders, Inc.; and another
between the Church and Barden. The latter contract,
dated July 30, 1998, contains the following arbitration
clause:
Any dispute arising out [***4] of this Agreement
will be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
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Rules of the Americem Arbitration Association. The
not struggle with given the result we reach in this
Purchaser shall be responsible for all attorneys fees
case.
incurred as a result of the failure to make timely
payments to The Barden & Robeson Corporation,
[***6]
including legal expenses of Arbitration. The nonprevailing party shall pay all costs attended to as a result
II.
of Arbitration.
STANDARD FOR PROHIBITION RELIEF
The Church maintains, inter alia, that there was no
agreement to arbitrate due to the fact that the trustees of
the Church executed a facsimile copy of the contract,
wherein the small print of the arbitration clause was
"virtually unreadable as a faxed document."
Following unsuccessful efforts at negotiating a
settlement to the dispute, nl the Church brought an
action against petitioners in the Circuit Court of Wood
County. There is apparently no dispute that petitioners
were served with the complaint on April 7, 1999. After
petitioners failed to respond to the complaint, the Church
moved for, and on June 1, 1999 was granted, a default
judgment pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 55. Petitioners
subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment
under Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the West [***5] Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure. In their motion, petitioners
relied upon the criteria set forth in syllabus point three of
Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 163 W. Va.
464, 256 S.E.2d 758 (1979), and asserted they should be
relieved from judgment because (1) the delay in
answering the complaint resulted from excusable neglect
in that Barden was required to engage in the timeconsuming task of retaining local counsel; and (2) the
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
action as a result of the purported agreement to arbitrate.
n2 [**109] [*166] According to petitioners, the circuit
court, at a hearing conducted on July 16, 1999, indicated
its intention to deny this motion. It is unclear as to
whether an order giving effect to such ruling has ever
been entered by the court below.

nl Prior to suit being filed, Barden informed
counsel for the Church, by correspondence dated
February 10, 1999, as to the existence of the
purported arbitration agreement.
n2 The arguments submitted to this Court, as
well as those tendered to the circuit court, make
no distinctions between the various petitioners.
Upon what theory petitioners Bob and Gene
Hutton base their attempt to benefit from the
provisions of Barden's contract with the Church,
as well as Barden's purported excuse for not
timely answering the complaint, is not clear.
However, this is a question that the Court need

In accord with the provisions of W. Va. Code § 531-1 (1923), "'prohibition lies only to restrain inferior
courts from proceeding in causes over which they have
no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are
exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as
a substitute for writ of error, appeal or certiorari.' Syl. pt.
1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W. Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370
(1953)." Syl. pt. 2, Cowiev. Roberts, 173 W. Va. 64, 312
S.E.2d 35 (1984). Although petitioners in this case may
have other avenues for challenging the jurisdiction of the
circuit court, this Court has previously indicated that
"where it appears that a court is proceeding without
jurisdiction ... prohibition will issue regardless of the
existence of other remedies." State ex rel. West Virginia
Truck Stops, Inc. v. McHugh, 160 W. Va. 294, 302, 233
S.E.2d 729, 734 (1977). See also Health Management,
Inc. v. Lindell,
W. Va. , 528 S.E2d 762, 767 n.6
(1999); State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo,
149 W. Va. 671, 679, 143 S.E.2d535, 541 (1965); syl. p t
1, Lake OWoods Club v. Wilhelm, 126 W. Va. 447, 28
S.E2d 915 (1944). [***7]
Importantly, "[a] writ of prohibition does not lie in
the absence of a clear showing that a trial court is without
jurisdiction to hear and determine a proceeding ...." Syl.
pt. 1, in part, Fahey v. Brennan, 136 W. Va. 666, 68
S.E2dl (1951). See also Fisher v. Bouchelle, 134 W. Va.
333, 335, 61 S.E2d 305, 306 (1950) ("the writ will not
be awarded in cases where it does not clearly appear that
the petitioner is entitled thereto"); syllabus, Vineyard v
O'Brien, 100 W. Va. 163, 130 S.E. Ill (1925) ("The writ
of prohibition will issue only in clear cases, where the
inferior tribunal is proceeding without, or in excess of,
jurisdiction.") Thus, we undertake limited review in this
case to determine whether the circuit court's action in
entering default judgment against petitioners was
distinctly outside of its jurisdiction.
III.
DISCUSSION
We begin our analysis in this case with the
fundamental premise that for "a court to hear and
determine an action, suit or other proceeding it must have
jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the
parties; both are necessary and the absence of either is
fatal to its jurisdiction. [***8] " Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel
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Smith v. Bosworth, 145 W. Va. 753, 117 S.E2d 610
("the parties to a contract may agree that a decision of
(1960). See also syl. pt. 1, McClay v. Mid-Atlantic
arbitrators or a third person is a condition precedent to
Country Magazine, 190 W. Va. 42, 435 S.E.2d 180
the right to bring an action upon the contract"). As a
(1993); syl. pt. 1, Schweppes U.S.A. Ltd. v. Kiger, 158 W.
condition precedent to litigating a dispute in the courts, a
Va. 794, 214 SK2d 867 (1975) ("In order to render a
valid and enforceable arbitration clause "precludes any
valid judgment or decree, a court must have jurisdiction
right of action until the procedure has been completed."
both of the parties and of the subject matter and any
Board ofEduc. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller,
judgment or decree rendered without such jurisdiction
Inc., 159 W. Va. 120, 126, 221 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1975)
will be utterly void."). In this case, our focus is solely
[***10] [hereafter "Miller I"\.
upon whether the default judgment entered by the circuit
This more recent view of arbitration as condition
court must be vacated for want of subject matter
precedent to litigation has its roots in cases that did, in
jurisdiction, based upon the alleged existence of a
fact, speak of arbitration in jurisdictional terms. At
binding and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. n3
common law, an agreement to arbitrate could be revoked
prior to an award being made. See Miller I, 159 W. Va. at
122, 221 S.E.2d at 883. This rule was predicated on the
n3 In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe,
antiquated notion that arbitration agreements are
159 W. Va. 200, 210, 220 S.E.2d672, 679 (1975),
unenforceable because parties cannot, by agreement, oust
we established the threshold standard by which a
a court of jurisdiction. n4 The only exception was that
court may exercise initial jurisdiction over an
arbitration was not revocable where it was made a
action:
condition precedent to a right of action. In Condon v.
South
Side R.R. Co., 55 Va. (14 Grat.) 302 (1858), the
The requirement of subject matter
Court
explained
that
jurisdiction is met initially if: 1) the court has the
general power to grant the type of relief
demanded under any circumstances; 2) the
n4 In Riley v. Jarvis, 43 W. Va. 43, 26 S.E.
pleadings demonstrate that a set of facts may
366 (1896), the Court stated that the reason why
exist which could arguably invoke the court's
the agreement was revocable under common law
jurisdiction; and 3) the allegations both with
was, not that arbitration was not favored by it as
regard to the facts and the applicable law are of
tending to end litigation, and not for want of
sufficient substance to require the court to make,
consideration, as the ending of litigation was
in an adversary proceeding, a reasoned
strong consideration, but because of that principle
determination of its own jurisdiction.
of law that parties could not, by agreement, oust
the courts of their jurisdiction assigned them by
Barden's arguments are confined to asserting that
law, and could not debar themselves from
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction in light of the
appealing to the law and tribunals of the land ....
arbitration provision in its contract with the
Id. at 48, 26 S.E. at 367.
Church. Consequently, our analysis is limited to
this claimed defect.
[***11]

[***9j [**no] [*167]
In syllabus point one oi Board of Educ. of Berkeley
County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 160 W. Va. 473, 236
S.E2d 439 (1977) [hereafter "Miller II'% we held, in
pertinent part, that "where parties to a contract agree to
arbitrate ... all disputes ... arising under the contract, and
where the parties bargained for the arbitration provision,
such provision is binding, and specifically enforceable."
This Court's past cases have recognized that a contract
provision requiring arbitration of disputes "creates a
condition precedent to any right of action or suit arising
under the contract." Syl. pt. 3, in part, Pettus v. Olga
Coal Co., 137 W. Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881 (1952). See
also State ex rel. Center Designs, Inc. v. Henning, 201
W. Va. 42, 45, 491 S.E2d 42, 45 (1997) (per curiam)

parties by their contract may lawfully make the
decision of arbitrators or of any third person a condition
precedent to a right of action upon the contract. In that
case such decision is a part of the cause of action. Until
the decision is made and the cause of action thus
becomes complete, the courts have no jurisdiction of the
case, and therefore cannot be said to be ousted of their
jurisdiction by the contract.
55 Va. at 314 (emphasis added). In Miller /, however,
we indicated that this common-law preoccupation with
"preventing parties by agreement from ousting courts of
jurisdiction, is frankly archaic." 159 W. Va. at 126, 221
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S.E.2d at 885. In truth, the jurisdictional concepts once
575 U.S. 528, 115 S Ct. 2322, 132 L. Ed. 2d 462
employed in the arbitration context were nothing more
(1995); Cranston Teachers Ass'n v. Cranston School
than "an illogical remnant of ancient English law."
Comm., 120 R.I. 105, 109, 386 A.2d 176, 178 (1978)
DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 76
(arbitration agreement does not implicate a court's
(1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). n5 Thus, we reject the
"power to adjudicate a dispute," but merely "raises the
jurisdictional bent of these older cases.
distinct question whether the court should have exercised
that power"); John Ashe Assoc, Inc. v. Envirogenics Co.,
425 F. Supp. 238, 241 n.3 (ED. Pa. 1977) ("The
n5 The Minnesota Supreme Court long ago
arbitration agreement [merely] limits the scope of the
recognized that Ihere appears never to have been
court's review, not its subject matter jurisdiction.").
any factual basis for holding that an agreement to
arbitrate "ousted" jurisdiction. It has no effect
Again, the right to arbitration is purely a matter of
upon the jurisdiction of any court. Arbitration
contract. Thus, "arbitration agreements are [as much]
simply removes a controversy from the arena of
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." Prima
litigation. It is no more an ouster of judicial
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement or
404 n. 12, 87 S Ct. 1801, 1806 n. 12, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270,
that peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity known
1277 n.12 (1967). As with any contract right, an
as the covenanl not to sue. Each disposes of
arbitration requirement may be waived through the
issues without litigation. One no more than the
conduct of the parties. See Earl T. Browder, Inc. v.
other ousts the courts of jurisdiction. The right to
County Court of Webster County, 143 W. Va. 406, 412,
a jury trial, even in a criminal case, may be
102 S.E.2d 425, 430 (1958) (holding that defendant's
waived. So, also, may the right to litigate be
neglect or refusal to arbitrate dispute constituted [***14]
waived. Such waiver may be the result of contract
waiver of right to require arbitration); Pettus, 137 W. Va.
or unilateral action.
at 500, 72 S.E.2d at 885 (binding arbitration provision
requires that '"suit cannot be brought until the award is
made, unless ... performance is excused by waiver or for
Park Constr. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No.
other good cause'") (citation omitted). We have stated
32, 209 Minn. 182, 186, 296 N. W. 475, 477
categorically that "subject matter jurisdiction may never
(1941).
be waived." Dishman v. Jarrell, 165 W. Va. 709, 712,
271 S.E2d 348, 350 (1980)) (citing West Virginia
[***12]
Secondary School Activities Comm'n v. Wagner, 143 W.
Va. 508, 102 S.E2d 901 (1958)). Obviously, this Court's
The focus of our more modern cases has been upon
treatment
of arbitration as a condition precedent
permitting, where appropriate, the enforceability of
otherwise
subject
to waiver or estoppel is wholly
private agreements to arbitrate according to their terms.
inconsistent with it being a jurisdictional prerequisite,
An arbitration agreement is nothing more than a
since the satisfaction of a jurisdictional requirement
contractual arrangement for resolving disputes [**111]
cannot be waived and may be joined in issue by the
[*168] by means other than court-supervised litigation.
parties or raised by the court at any time during judicial
As is now widely recognized, such agreements ... are not
proceedings.
destructive of jurisdiction. They are, precisely,
agreements, and as such may be pleaded as a personal
In this case, unless it is able to show good cause for
defense. However, like any such right, they may be
its default, Robeson has waived its right to assert
waived. ... Plaintiffs' ... [assertions], to the effect that the
arbitration as an affirmative defense against continued
court has no "jurisdiction" until agreed-on arbitration has
litigation in the circuit court. As an affirmative defense,
been conducted, do not concern jurisdiction in the basic
arbitration must be asserted in [***15] the answer or it
sense, but stand merely for the proposition that if either
may, under appropriate circumstances, be deemed
party seasonably claims his right to arbitrate, the
waived pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 8(c). n6 See
agreement must be recognized.
American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal
Imaging, Inc., 96 F. 3d 88, 96 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirmative
[**112] [*169] defense of arbitration must be pled in
Morales Rivera v. Sea Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 418
answer); McDonnell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 620
F.2d 725, 727 (1st Cir. 1969) (citations omitted). See
F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1985) ("the affirmative
also Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
defense of arbitration must appear in the answer, and 'a
Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 733 (1st Cir. 1994) ("An agreement
party's failure to plead an affirmative defense bars its
to arbitrate does not deprive a federal court of its
invocation at later stages of the litigation.'") (citation
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute."), affd, [***13]
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omitted). Moreover, in denying the performance of
judgment. n7 Even where arbitration rights are timely
arbitration as a condition precedent, the proponent of
asserted and judicial proceedings are stayed pending the
arbitration must make such an allegation "specifically
outcome of the arbitration, a circuit court still retains
and with particularity." W. Va. R. Civ. P. 9(c).
jurisdiction over the matter such that any resulting award
Unexcused conduct that results in the entry of a default
may be judicially enforced. See Miller II, 160 W. Va. at
judgment is no less of an implicit waiver of a right to
496, 236 S.E.2d at 452 (Miller, J., concurring). We
arbitration than any other procedural forfeiture.
therefore find no merit in petitioners' argument that the
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default
judgment against them.
n6 Rule 8(c) provides:
Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
When a party has mistakenly designated a
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a
proper designation.

n7 Our research has uncovered only two
cases that deal directly with the question of
whether a court has jurisdiction to enter a default
judgment upon a contract containing an
arbitration provision. In both of these unreported
decisions, the courts found no merit in the
argument that an agreement to arbitrate divests a
court of the jurisdiction necessary to enter a
default judgment. See Olde Discount Corp. v.
RCKCorp., Inc., 110F.3d69, 1997 WL 133239,
at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) ("Because
[defendant] failed to assert the arbitration issue in
a timely fashion, we find no merit to his
contention that the court should have set aside the
default judgment.") (citation omitted); Cho Yang
Shipping Co., Ltd. v. American Freight Lines,
Ltd., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14918, No. 94 Civ.
0347, 1994 WL 577006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,
1994) ("[Plaintiffs] failure to initiate arbitration
proceedings may have amounted to a breach of
contract, in which case [defendant] had the option
of asserting a counter-claim or moving to compel
arbitration. [Defendant's] options did not include
ignoring this action.").

(Emphasis added.) Some courts have held that the
enumerated requirement of pleading "arbitration
and award" pertains exclusively to completed
arbitration proceedings. See Lee v. Grandcor
Med. Sys., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo.
1988). However, Rule 8(c) is not exhaustive, and
we discern that arbitration clearly falls under the
catch-all provision of the rule as "any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense." Cfi Greene v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 871 F. Supp. 1427, 1431 (N.D. Ala. 1994)
(waiver question examined in light of catch-all
provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)).
[***16]
Consequently, we hold that the mere existence of a
contractual agreement among litigants to arbitrate a
dispute does not deprive a circuit court of subject matter
jurisdiction so as to prevent the entry of a default

[***17]
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the requested writ of
prohibition is denied.
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CALIFORNIA
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 1292.2
§1292.2. Except as otherwise provided in this article, any petition made after the
commencement or completion of arbitration shall be filed in a court having
jurisdiction in the county where the arbitration is being or has been held, or, if not
held exclusively in any one county of this state, or if held outside of this state, then
the petition shall be filed as provided in Section 1292.
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CALIFORNIA
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 1293
§1293. The making of an agreement in this State providing for arbitration to be
had within this State shall be deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enforce such agreement by the making of
any orders provided for in this title and by entering of judgment on an award under
the agreement.
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